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Some twenty years ago, for another conference in which one of us had a 
hand, the political scientist and co-originator of the field of American Political 
Development, Karen Orren, wrote an essay entitled “Metaphysics and Reality in 
Late Nineteenth-Century Labor Adjudication.”1 The essay rehearsed arguments 
Orren would elaborate in her book Belated Feudalism.2 
The metaphysics in Orren’s title were those of the common law of master 
and servant, “based on custom and precedent . . . accreted and enforced in judicial 
holdings.” Undisturbed by democratic or industrial revolutions, the common law’s 
rules remained secreted in the interstices of the American Constitution, “detached 
from their original settings, placed in a framework of concepts, the reasonability of 
which was defined through a process of exposition by professionally trained 
intellects.”3 The reality, by contrast, was the material reality of the workplace, 
which existed simultaneously in two moments: the ancient moment to which the 
rules of master and servant corresponded, and the moment of the late nineteenth 
 
* Christopher Tomlins is Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine.  
** John Comaroff is Harold H. Swift Distinguished Service Professor of Anthropology and Social 
Sciences at the University of Chicago.  
1. Karen Orren, Metaphysics and Reality in Late Nineteenth-Century Labor Adjudication, in LABOR 
LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 160 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. 
King eds., 1992). 
2. KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1991). 
3. Orren, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
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century, when those same rules encountered opposition—strikes, pickets, 
boycotts, industrial violence—which, for the first time, demonstrated “that the old 
principles no longer held.”4 
Orren proceeded to connect that opposition to “broader cultural currents” at 
work in the epoch, specifically the currents of pragmatism.5 Kunal Parker’s essay 
in this issue describes their impact.6 The last three pages of Orren’s essay were a 
virtual honor roll of the “antimetaphysical” club—the intellectuals, public and 
private, whose so-called revolt against formalism marks the advent of early 
twentieth-century progressivism: William James, Charles Sanders Pierce, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., but also John Dewey, Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, Walter 
Lippmann, Roscoe Pound, and many more.7 Hand in hand, as it were, the labor 
movement and intellectuals fashioned a wholesale transformation of American 
politics and culture, a victory of latter-day materiality over antimodern 
metaphysics that would furnish the ideational bedrock for the liberal politics of 
the twentieth century, for its liberal legalism, and for their insistence that all 
knowledge was historical and social. 
Twenty years after Orren’s essay and a century after the antimetaphysical 
revolution, “law as . . .” stands, modestly, for a distinct intellectual moment; not by 
any means another proclamation of a new currency over outworn forms, but 
something rather different, a moment of reconsideration, a pause to contemplate 
what the theory and practice of history might gain by rejoining metaphysics to 
materiality. 
I. FROM “LAW AND” TO “LAW AS . . .” 
Of Genealogy and History 
“Law as . . .” identifies the early twentieth-century revolt as the moment of 
invention of “law and,” first mooted in Roscoe Pound’s turn-of-the-century 
distinction between “law in the books” and “law in action,” nurtured subsequently 
in the bosom of realism, and thoroughly popularized by the law and society 
movement.8 “Law and” relies on empirical context to situate law as a domain of 
activity. It explains law through its relations to cognate but distinct domains of 
action (society, polity, economy, culture) by parsing the interactions among them.9 
Both the theory and the practice of contemporary legal history exemplify the 
 
4. Id. at 161. 
5. Id. at 171, 172–73. 
6. See Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 
1790–1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587 (2011). 
7. Orren, supra note 1, at 172–75; see generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 
(2001); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 
(Beacon Press 1957) (1949). 
8. Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous Is Law?, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 45, 59–62 (2007). 
9. Id. at 46–47, 61–65. 
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influence of “law and” in their resort to synchronic analyses of relational 
conjunction and disjunction, to which they add diachrony in order to reveal the 
effect of law, or to explain its reality, by assessing change in its relation to other 
phenomena over time. Unsurprisingly, the animating hypotheses of twentieth-
century legal history embrace the same broad relational problematics that have 
preoccupied twentieth century “law and” theory: instrumentalism, relative 
autonomy, mutual constitutiveness, legal construction, autopoiesis, and 
indeterminacy.10 
The shift to “law as . . .” suggests something else, something distinctive. 
Concretely, it suggests that explanations of law are not to be found, either 
necessarily or sufficiently, in its relations to other things. As Shai Lavi notes, with 
justification, the shift affords an opportunity to think beyond long-familiar 
Weberian categories and trajectories.11 It is not determinedly programmatic, a 
route to the next big concept, but open-ended (hence the ellipsis). Yet it would be 
idle to pretend that “law as . . .” takes no position, that it is not historically 
situated. Blithely unaware of it at the outset, the conveners of the conference 
where the essays here were first presented have discovered that we are on a path 
that others are also following. We find ourselves riding a wave, one reverberating 
in both legal12 and historical13 scholarship. 
The wave owes its existence to developments in both history and law. As to 
the latter, it has never been more of a “hypostatized construct” than at present.14 
We return to this observation below.15 But what of the former? It, too, 
hypostatizes itself, though in a more limited sense, being a professional practice 
with less instrumental reach. Still, as a professional practice, contemporary history, 
like law, is full of talk of itself. 
History’s talk is of what history has to offer the present.16 One offering is the 
narrative history that has become something of a staple of literary nonfiction. 
Narrative history represents history as edifying stories of the past. As Gordon 
 
10. Id. at 47–59. See generally Christopher Tomlins, Law and History, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 723 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008); Christopher 
Tomlins, What Would Langdell Have Thought? UC Irvine’s New Law School and the Question of History, 1 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 185, 242–45 (2011); Christopher Tomlins, What Is Left of the Law & Society 
Paradigm After Critique? Revisiting Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
(forthcoming 2012). 
11. Shai J. Lavi, Enchanting a Disenchanted Law: On Jewish Ritual and Secular History in Nineteenth-
Century Germany, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 813, 815 (2011). 
12. See generally Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 633 (2011). 
13. See generally Michael Saler, Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic Review, 111 AM. HIST. 
REV. 692 (2006). 
14. PERRY ANDERSON, ARGUMENTS WITHIN ENGLISH MARXISM 200 (1980). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 143–53. 
16. The following observations rely heavily on Christopher Tomlins, History Lessons, PERSP. 
ON HIST.: NEWSMAGAZINE AM. HIST. ASS’N, Dec. 2010, at 31, 31–33; see also Tomlins, What Would 
Langdell Have Thought?, supra note 10, at 210–15. 
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Wood describes it in a recent issue of Perspectives on History, narrative history 
attends to the exceptional: “individual personalities . . . unique public 
happenings.”17 By their very nonrecurrent nature, the individual and the unique 
are easily sequestered in bygone times, from which they can be appropriated at will 
to offer homiletic advice to the present. 
Narrative history conforms, broadly, to one of the three archetypes of which 
Friedrich Nietzsche wrote in 1874 in the second of his “untimely meditations”: 
the monumental.18 Another conception, history as science—offered by Wood 
himself as antidote to the shortcomings of narrative—conforms to another 
Nietzschean archetype: the antiquarian.19 As Wood characterizes it, scientific 
history is like a coral reef, based on the premise that “historical knowledge is 
accumulative and that the steady accretion of specialized monographs will 
eventually deepen and broaden our understanding of the past.”20 Its domain is the 
social; its ideology, unsurprisingly, modernism; its spirit, objectivity—the capacity 
to know the past as it really was, and ever more completely. 
The scientific writer of history . . . builds a classic temple: simple, severe, 
symmetrical in its lines, surrounded by the clear bright light of truth, 
pervaded by the spirit of moderation. Every historical fact is a stone 
hewn from the quarry of past records; it must be solid and square and 
even-hued—an ascertained fact . . . . His design already exists, the events 
have actually occurred, the past has really been—his task is to approach 
as near to the design as he possibly can.21 
This is the historian’s version of Holmes’s “nothing but history.”22 
But because the phenomena studied by the scientific historian are 
recurrent—for example, human behavior—they are not so easily sequestered in 
the past. On the contrary, they lure the historian toward “presentism.” Some 
versions of scientific history accept the lure.23 Others resist it. Those that resist do 
so by insisting on the absolute temporality of all phenomena—their watchword is 
“context”—from which follows a rigid distinction between then and now, a 
 
17. Gordon S. Wood, In Defense of Academic History Writing, PERSP. ON HIST.: 
NEWSMAGAZINE AM. HIST. ASS’N, Apr. 2010, at 19, 19. 
18. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in UNTIMELY 
MEDITATIONS 57, 67–72 (Daniel Breazeale ed., R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1997). 
19. Id. at 72–75. 
20. Wood, supra note 17, at 20. 
21. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 56 (1988) (quoting Edward P. Cheyney). 
22. Parker, supra note 6, at 589; see also KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–1900, at 1–24, 259–78 (2011). 
23. One example is orthodox historical materialism, on which see Christopher Tomlins, 
Toward a Materialist Jurisprudence, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, 
IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 196, 198–99 (Daniel W. 
Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010). 
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cæsura that underscores the absolute difference of the past.24 Parker notes 
Holmes’ disgust at the past’s insidious slide into the present: “It is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past.”25 
Modernist scientific history describes a form of historical practice one can 
term “simple accumulation.” It has spawned a critical response; call it “complex 
accumulation.” Complex accumulation accepts the ineradicable difference of the 
past: its watchword, too, is “context.” But unlike simple accumulation, it treats 
material life as radically underdetermined. Far from an assemblage of essentially 
similar phenomena, historical knowledge is deeply vulnerable to multiplicitous 
variation that constantly intrudes upon the historian’s capacity to generalize. The 
difference between simple and complex accumulation is observable in the entirely 
contrasting meanings of “historicism” associated with each of them. Where simple 
accumulation aspires to predicability, complex accumulation repudiates causal 
explanation; this because it eschews the idea that consensus can be established on 
a means of disciplining evidence and, hence, of producing theory. For 
“historicism” as positivist science, complex accumulation substitutes “historicism” 
as contingency: a past composed of an infinity of utterly contextualized, utterly 
discrete, phenomena—that is, an entirely indeterminate past.26 
Notwithstanding their differences, modernist (“simple accumulation”) and 
postmodernist (“complex accumulation”) historiography share a commitment to 
contextualizing their subjects; therein lies a significant commonality of purpose. 
For both, too, the cæsura that amputates past from present is the necessary 
condition of their practice, creating a distinct subject on which to reflect, with 
which to converse. For both, historical method begins by putting the past in its 
place. 
To identify history as the contextualization of past acts and events is entirely 
understandable, but it does not exhaust the possibilities. Take for example 
Nietzsche’s third archetype: the critical. Instead of appropriating the past to 
inspire the present, or merely preserving it, critical history interrogates, judges, and 
condemns the past in order to free the present from its grasp. In this way, critical 
history serves life. Its enemy is scholasticism: “knowledge not attended by action   
. . . history as a costly superfluity and luxury.”27 
 
24. See Christopher Tomlins, The Strait Gate: The Past, History, and Legal Scholarship, 5 L. 
CULTURE & HUMAN. 11, 21–22 (2009). 
25. Parker, supra note 6, at 589 (quoting 3 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 391, 399 (Sheldon Novick ed., 1995) (1897)). 
26. For the distinct meanings of historicism, compare Wood, supra note 17, at 19–20, with 
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017 (1981). See also NOVICK, 
supra note 21, at 7, 143, 157; Tomlins, supra note 24, at 11–31. 
27. NIETZSCHE, supra note 18, at 59, 75–77. 
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One might properly embrace critique as the purpose of history. Many have. 
To do so, however, requires that one take a position on the past. Nietzsche’s 
ultimate objective was to overcome the past. In contrast, the objective of “law as    
. . .” is to use it to confront the present. To do so, “law as . . .” rejects the 
sequestration of the past and the various histories that result from it. “Law as . . .” 
dwells instead on the conditions of possibility for a critical knowledge of the here-
and-now: the moment, it might be said, when the origins of the present “jut 
manifestly and fearsomely into existence,”28 spirit into experience, metaphysics 
into materiality: 
Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has, 
nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is 
not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into 
being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of 
becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of 
becoming, and in its current it swallows the material involved in the 
process of genesis. That which is original is never manifest in the naked 
and manifest existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual 
insight. On the one hand it needs to be recognized as a process of 
restoration and reestablishment, but on the other hand, and precisely 
because of this, as something imperfect and incomplete. There takes 
place in every original phenomenon a determination of the form in which 
an idea will constantly confront the historical world, until it is revealed 
fulfilled, in the totality of its history.29 
If this is “law as . . .”—or, at least, one rendition of it—how do the essays 
that appear here under its imprint measure up? Is this a club to which their 
authors would wish to belong? 
 
28. 1 WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1913–1928, at 236, 
242 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 1996). 
29. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA 45–46 (John Osborne 
trans., Verso Books 2003) (1963). A somewhat distinct translation of (most of) the same passage can 
be found in SAMUEL WEBER, BENJAMIN’S -ABILITIES 88–89 (2008). Commenting on the passage, 
Weber adds,  
The concept of origin that Benjamin articulates in this passage contrasts sharply with the 
creatio ex nihilo—or more precisely, creation out of formlessness—that informs the biblical 
text of Genesis. Instead, the notion of origin—and hence the notion of the original—is 
construed not as an absolute beginning, nor as the passage from formlessness to form, nor 
as the result of anything like the intervention of a divine logos. It is also not conceived as a 
function of becoming (Werden) or of its dialectical counterpart, passing away (Vergehen). . . . 
An “origin” is historical in that it seeks to repeat, restore, reinstate something anterior to it. 
In so doing, however, it never succeeds and therefore remains “incomplete, unfinished.” 
Yet it is precisely such incompleteness that renders origin historical. Its historicality resides not 
in its ability to give rise to a progressive, teleological movement, but rather in its power to 
return incessantly to the past and through the rhythm of its ever-changing repetitions set 
the pace for the future. 
Id. at 89. 
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II. NORMATIVE SYSTEMS, HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS 
Of Texts and Explanations 
Steven Wilf has one foot, his Chancellor’s foot, the normative foot of the 
legal scholar, inside the door. His historian’s foot remains outside, in the mid-air 
of complex temporality and relationality, of radically situated subjects, layered 
strata, and paths not taken, of alternative worlds and countergenealogies, “out of 
the cradle, endlessly orbiting.”30 The straddle is as it should be, for Wilf’s is an 
image of legal history poised between technicality and time, “mixing overly 
mutable texts with overly rigid forms of reading.”31 He recommends reading texts 
schizophrenically, which is to say in a manner that resists the dominant traits of 
each of the discipline’s lobes: history’s positivist descriptivism, which incessantly 
produces narratives of how things really were; and law’s linear instrumentalism, 
which not only denies the existence of any alternative but pointedly ignores its 
own utopic idealism. The resistances (contingency and possibility) are as 
complementary, of course, as the dominant traits (positivism and 
instrumentalism). Their amalgamation produces a new personality, beset by a 
corrosive though constructive uncertainty. Wilf has created “a roguish thing,”32 
the first of many specters from the looking-glass world of “law as . . .” that will 
wreak havoc with the law of which we are certain, for which “we have a measure, 
know what to trust to”—and also with the history that “make[s] the standard for 
the measure.”33 
Wilf offers serial means, allegorical devices, to inspect the thickly clustered 
normative systems beyond law’s linear limits and history’s descriptions, none more 
evocative than Blake’s telescope and Galileo’s observatory.34 Together they 
remind us of a third optical allusion perched, temporally, more or less midway 
between them: William Hogarth’s 1724 engraving of “Some of the Principal 
Inhabitants of ye Moon, as they Were Perfectly Discover’d by a Telescope brought 
to ye Greatest Perfection,” also known, curtly, as “Royalty, Episcopacy and 
Law.”35 The engraving is entirely emblematic. Royalty’s face is the coin of the 
realm. Around its neck is a string of bubbles. Cloven-hoofed episcopacy works a 
money pump. Law is a hammer in a periwig. Like Blake’s telescope, Hogarth’s has 
 
30. Arthur C. Clarke, Out of the Cradle, Endlessly Orbiting . . . (1959), reprinted in THE 
COLLECTED STORIES OF ARTHUR C. CLARKE 697 (2000). 
31. Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 543, 564 (2011). 
32. JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 61 (photo. reprint 1979) (Samuel 
Harvey Reynolds ed., 1892). 
33. Id. 
34. Wilf, supra note 31, at 562–64. 
35. See WILLIAM HOGARTH, ROYALTY, EPISCOPACY AND LAW (1724), available at 
http://exhibits.library.northwestern.edu/spec/hogarth/politics3.html. Hogarth’s engraving satirizes 
Sir James Thornhill’s paintings of William and Mary and their royal court, which adorn the Painted 
Hall of the Old Royal Naval College, Greenwich. 
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magnified its objects. It has not touched them. But it need not do so. Merely 
magnifying their surfaces shows them, in their singularities and intimacy, as they 
are. Observation is indeed the beginning of heresy. As readers and writers of texts, 
interpreters of objects and tellers of tales about them, we can learn a lot from the 
engraver’s eye—particularly this one, who was so great an observer and, with it, a 
great theorist of observation.36 
Laura Edwards provides us with a concrete instance of what Wilf advocates, 
a new reading of a legal archive that produces a new text-in-context: the 
“formulaic phrasing” (boilerplate) of “the peace,” translated into a novel way of 
understanding the thickly normative order of the Anglo-American community—
“the ideal order of the metaphorical public body.”37 So completely does the peace 
entwine law and society that law in society became law as society, “literally located 
. . . in actual social relations.”38 In Edwards’s essay, locality is both a place and a 
state of mind. Law and society blur together; inhabitants imagine justice as the 
restoration of a particular social order, as the resolution of conflict, as the repair of 
strains in hierarchy, as the recreation of habitual practice, and as the reproduction 
of the status quo. The logic of the peace is reiteration, repetition. 
Edwards does not deny that law and society can be seen as distinct. Indeed, 
she notes that a self-consciously discrete legal system came into being after the 
American Revolution. Invented by post-Revolutionary leaders committed to 
establishing clearly defined governing institutions and laws at national and state 
level, it was characterized by a distinctive repertoire of concepts (rights, 
democracy) and by particular textual and institutional practices (statutes, cases). 
But that legal system was not the sum of law, although it has been treated almost 
invariably as if it were. By peeling away state law Edwards uncovers localized law, 
bringing a far wider geography into legal history and, with it, in the American case, 
a new understanding of rights and democracy. Observing the emergence of rights 
as the signal means to configure people’s relationship to law becomes less an 
exercise in documenting the progressive extension of those rights to previously 
excluded groups than in disinterring the genesis of a framework that exacerbated 
existing inequalities by using the principle of equality to sort subjects into those 
with access and those without. “A system based in individual rights made 
subordinate people without rights even more vulnerable than they already were by 
cutting off all access to the legal system.”39 Where local legalities had granted 
highly unequal participation to all, state legality created exclusive modes of access 
 
36. See WILLIAM HOGARTH, THE ANALYSIS OF BEAUTY. WRITTEN WITH A VIEW OF FIXING 
THE FLUCTUATING IDEAS OF TASTE (1753); see generally JACK LINDSAY, HOGARTH: HIS ART AND 
HIS WORLD (1977). 
37. Laura Edwards, The Peace: The Meaning and Production of Law in the Post-Revolutionary United 
States, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 565 (2011). 
38. Id. at 566. 
39. Id. at 575. 
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by constituting white males as freemen “through their rights over those without 
rights.”40 Rather than progress, in other words, history charts a movement over 
time from a plurality of local legal orders to sameness—although we should note 
that those local orders were themselves dedicated to the reproduction of the same. 
Legal history has tied itself to a conception of law as a phenomenon 
separable from society. Edwards argues that this is deeply problematic. She draws 
attention to the simultaneous existence of legalities in markedly distinct forms, at 
different levels and places, with different participants, all of which should enter 
the legal historian’s field of vision. Indeed they must, she argues, if legal history is 
to survive as a field of study. Like Wilf, Edwards’ predominant tone is one of 
caution in appraising the field’s prospects, but her solution points us in a different 
direction, toward history rather than to a thickened normativity. Legal history 
ought to pay more attention to history in general, lest it become an outlier, 
difficult to penetrate, preoccupied with arcane issues outside the mainstream. 
Historians at large are finding legal texts increasingly useful, but not the scholarship 
that purports to explain them. Even as the stuff of its imagination grows more 
central, the field courts marginality: “We need new frameworks to widen the 
scope of the field, lest we lose control over it.”41 
Kunal Parker tells us, in a nutshell, what the existing framework is.42 It 
locates law “in” history, localized to time and place, contextualized, its internalities 
externalized. By historicizing law, by rendering it contingent, this framework 
seems to undermine the pretense of separation that disturbs Edwards. Why, then, 
should she be disturbed? Perhaps because no amount of contextualization can 
conceal that the initial move to contextualize necessarily arises from an initial 
relational assumption: to imagine law “in” context—or “in” history—requires that 
one be able to imagine it apart from that context in order to know the difference. 
Once introduced, Parker confirms, relationality is infinite, like mirrors set 
opposite each other. “As scholarship relentlessly historicizing law pours out, 
offering us endlessly complex pictures of law’s past and pointing to the plurality of 
missed opportunities in the past (all of which are supposed to mirror the open 
possibilities of the future), one cannot help but experience a sense of intellectual 
exhaustion.”43 Why exhaustion? Because, having entered its way of thinking, there 
is literally no means to avoid being overwhelmed by the endlessness of 
historicism, by its world “after” metaphysics—the world of nothing-but-history 
that has become ever provisional, ever provincial.44 The loss of self-control that 
Edwards warns against is actually a corollary of the turn of legal history toward the 
vertiginous historicism that is the chief component of the “new frameworks” she 
 
40. Id. at 583. 
41. Id. at 585. 
42. Parker, supra note 6, at 594, 607. 
43. Id. at 593; see also MARILYN STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS 119 (1991). 
44. Steven Wilf offers variations on the same theme. See Wilf, supra note 31. 
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seeks. 
Parker points us in a different direction, away from antifoundational history 
and back toward law. Specifically, he points us toward the common law during the 
long nineteenth century, invoked by Kent early on as the water of life, 
determinedly evaporated eighty years later by the reigning disenchanter of the 
American legal tradition, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Holmes, who, recall, 
dissolved both life and law in the acid bath of “nothing but history” that was to be 
the enduring fate of the twentieth century. Parker describes an America quite 
distinct from the postfoundational world with which we are familiar, “in which the 
notion of given constraints was very real indeed.”45 In that America, political 
democracy shared authority with the common law as a “non-self-chosen” 
instrument of constraint, committed to upholding precedent and repeating the 
past.46 The common law was nonchosen because it was immemorial—unfolding 
outside historical time, changing “insensibly,” always adjusting the needs of the 
present to the claims of the past and the future.47 
Eventually, the common law would be sucked dry by intellectuals insistent 
on draining nineteenth-century life of its phantasmagoria, the void filled by the 
incessant hubbub of their own reflective intellection. Progressive Era thinkers 
followed Holmes in assailing the law’s immemoriality.48 It was to be reduced to 
politics, made in the present from the knowledge of expert nonlawyers, endlessly 
revisable. Parker’s invocation of the common law is elegiac in the full sense of the 
word. He mourns that which is irreversibly dead, but does not yearn romantically 
for its revival. By paying attention to their antecedents he shows how two of the 
most relentlessly positivist of scholarly discourses—modern American history and 
modern American law—stand revealed as settled knowledges. Simultaneously he 
makes it plain that reference to those very antecedents reinfuses both history and 
law with the capacity for a certain mystery, animating their capacity to unsettle 
“settled knowledge” but without paying the exorbitant price demanded by what 
we have come to call postmodernism, which is that knowledge shall never, ever, 
settle again. What was science the first time around, in other words, can do a 
second lap as metaphysics. Do we not, he asks, even in our postfoundational 
world, continue to think foundationally about democracy itself as a mystic 
 
45. Parker, supra note 6, at 596. 
46. Id. at 603. Here Parker is in harmony with Laura Edwards’s emphasis on the dedication of 
“the peace” to reiteration—the restoration and repetition of given constraints. See Edwards, supra note 
37, at 565–66. 
47. Parker, supra note 6, at 601. Compare id., with Roger Berkowitz, From Justice to Justification: An 
Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 611, 618–19 (2011) (discussing the 
metaphysical heart of Leibniz’s legal science). 
48. Parker notes that for Holmes, law was experience rather than logic—the product of 
nothing but history—but that experience alone could not justify law. Experience (history) as 
repetition did not count. Law as “mere ‘blind imitation of the past’ would not do.” If law was to 
repeat the past it must be with self-conscious (present-minded) purpose. Parker, supra note 6, at 589 
(quoting HOLMES, supra note 25, at 469). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
2011] AFTERWORD 1049 
 
teleology of ever-expanding rights, freedoms, and equalities?49 
III. LAW, METAPHYSICS, JUSTICE 
Of Connection, Disconnection, Reconnection, (In)completion 
Roger Berkowitz also examines the historical detachment of law from 
metaphysics—and the possibility of their reconnection.50 The essence of legal 
positivism, he argues, lies not in its acknowledgment of human will in lawmaking, 
but in its attempt to justify laws that have lost their natural authority: their claim to 
justice, that is, located in divine rationality. In support, Berkowitz offers a 
genealogy that traces contemporary positivism to the serial efforts of German 
legal science to find justification for law. His point of departure is Leibniz, for 
whom science, the authority of objective truth, was the specifically modern way 
both to justify law and to repair its connection to justice. 
Importantly, at the core of Leibniz’s scientific method lay a metaphysical 
conception of the origin of substance. “A true beginning . . . must be something 
from which nothing temporal, spatial, or causal can be removed.”51 We encounter 
here a distinct but recognizable statement of immemoriality—origin that was 
nonphysical and nonhistorical. Immemoriality was, of itself, enough of an 
explanation of genesis for the common law’s adherents. In their genealogy, the 
detachment of law from the divine was incomplete.52 Leibniz, however, took a 
further step in the construction of a metaphysics of origin by applying his first 
principle of science, the principle of sufficient reason: nothing is without a reason. 
The subordination of law to its reason for being made it the expression of a first 
principle—universal well-willing, the entirely rational expression of God’s 
judicious wisdom—transforming it “from an authoritative statement of a practice 
into a forceful product of the scientific knowing of justice . . . [a] scientifically 
decipherable rationality . . . .”53 
Leibniz reached Anglo-American common law, Berkowitz argues, by way of 
the nineteenth-century legal science of Savigny and Jhering. The transmission was 
hardly perfect. In place of Leibniz’s rationalist ontology, Savigny located the origin 
of law in the life of the Volksgeist, the common spirit and consciousness of the 
people/nation. No longer knowable spontaneously by “insight,” law’s essence 
could still be discovered by means of a geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft (historical legal 
science) whose object of inquiry was the “organic principle, by which what is still 
living will automatically separate itself from what is dead and belongs only to 
 
49. Parker, supra note 6. 
50. Berkowitz, supra note 47. 
51. Id. at 617. 
52. See Peter Goodrich, Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been Written, 
1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 773 (2011). 
53. Berkowitz, supra note 47, at 619. 
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history.”54 Here was no philosophical disquisition upon universal and rational legal 
principles. Here, rather, was an attempt to separate the living-on—“historically 
grounded legal principles active in the national consciousness . . . . the ‘living unity 
that binds the present to the past’”—from all that had passed irretrievably away, 
so that law’s restatement in the form of technical “concepts and formulas” 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz) remained “shot through with life-inspired insight.”55 
If Savigny’s legal science shared its emphasis on life-and-becoming with 
aspects of the nineteenth-century common law thought described by Parker, 
Jhering’s critique of that science corresponds to Progressive Era thinkers’ 
antifoundationalist reaction to the immemoriality of the common law. Like them, 
Jhering counterposed human intention to what looked like an entirely historical 
determination of outcomes. Law was a human product, a formal system of rules 
that served ends discoverable by the social sciences.56 Neither its origins nor its 
ends were to be found in any metaphysical realm of “transcendent unity,” whether 
conceived philosophically (Leibniz) or historically (Savigny). By thus subordinating 
“a merely technical law” to other-determined ends, Berkowitz argues, Jhering 
fulfilled “Leibniz’s original insight that positive law must be subordinated to 
reasons” while simultaneously sundering the attempt made by both Leibniz and 
Savigny to make science the bond of law to justice.57 Twentieth-century law 
remains dependent on science for justification, but no science of law has 
succeeded in establishing itself as a science of justice. “Instead, science has 
transformed law into a technical means for governments to pursue political, social 
and economic ends.”58 Even so, the ideal of justice remains alive. Perhaps, says 
Berkowitz, simply knowing that law is divorced from justice is the first step to 
bridging the gap. 
Marianne Constable, too, addresses the gap between law and justice, 
reconnecting them, aspirationally, with rhetoric.59 The task is executed in two 
steps. The first is to understand law as contextualized practice or “speech act,” 
thus to collapse the realist separation of “law on the books” from “law in action” 
into “law as claim,” specifically the claim of authority. This directs our attention 
away from the twentieth century’s stress on social outcomes as the only 
worthwhile empirical, and implicitly normative, determinant of law; we return to 
law not as instrumental means to an end but as the embodiment of a species of 
 
54. Id. at 621. 
55. Id. at 622–23. 
56. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). For 
Jhering’s influence on Progressive Era legal thought, see MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: 
SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 96–115 (2003). 
57. Berkowitz, supra note 47, at 627. 
58. Id. at 629. 
59. Marianne Constable, Law as Claim to Justice: Legal History and Legal Speech Acts, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 631, 631 (2011). 
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action, one that “tells us what to do.”60 The second step is to note that, in telling 
us what to do, the utterances that stake the claim of law to authority bind it, 
whether willingly or despite itself, to issues of justice. “Claims on behalf of and 
within the ‘system,’ as well as claims made against it, appeal however silently, 
however strategically, however hypocritically, to justice.”61 Even speech that 
denies the connection cannot avoid the issue. “It is not the province of the court 
to decide upon the justice or injustice . . . of [the law] . . . but to administer it as we 
find it.”62 Here our attention is drawn to the speaker’s disclaimer and so to the 
very question s/he refuses to entertain. “Neither a God nor a higher law, but the 
claiming that goes on in legal speech acts, binds us to issues of justice.”63 
In our disenchantment we have learned, as Roger Berkowitz shows, to see 
justice as evanescent, residual, drowned out by the sociolegal positivism that, in 
Constable’s book, Just Silences, is the acme of contemporary law: the law of “law 
and” that “relegates connections between law and justice, if any, to empirically 
contingent social realities.”64 Here, legal history fashions a place for itself 
alongside rhetoric as a means to recover those connections by disclosing instances 
from the past in which “law has mattered as a name and as an act that was linked 
. . . to issues of justice . . . .”65 In so doing, Constable argues, legal history reveals 
itself to be an enterprise appropriately distinct from other practices of history, not 
one that should seek greater companionship with them; it is a purposive enterprise 
inhabited by the “thick normativity” Wilf recommends. “How acts or events or 
claims or utterances ‘in the name of the law’ have mattered is the peculiar 
contribution of history to legal scholarship.”66 
Christopher Schmidt begins precisely with a speech act, a claim about law 
and its connection to justice made by student leaders of the 1960 American sit-in 
movement, a movement whose activism stood in vivid contrast to the legalism of 
the NAACP. The student claim was that law is too slow in its response to 
injustice, that resort to action in the world outside law—“society”—is the only 
way to achieve justice.67 
The cleavage between law and society that Schmidt detects in student 
rhetoric conforms to the positivist distinction of means from ends noted by 
Berkowitz. Sociolegal scholars and legal historians who stress law’s constitutive 
capacities in social processes might question the tendency to separate the two. But 
 
60. Id. at 636. 
61. Id. 
62. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857). 
63. Constable, supra note 59, at 636. 
64. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN 
LAW 10 (2005). 
65. Constable, supra note 59, at 640. 
66. Id. 
67. Christopher W. Schmidt, Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 641, 641–42 (2011) 
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“the subjects of . . . historical inquiry can often be quite insistent” in seeing law 
and society as distinct.68 Nor were the students alone. Segregationists defended the 
norms and customs of their communities from federal law that impinged on them 
from “outside.” Racial liberals as insistently advocated federal intervention, 
regarding “outside” law precisely as a means to transform local social practice. “In 
each of these instances, the essential characteristic of law was its perceived 
separateness from something else.”69 There were contrary views, however. In 
intellectually different ways, Schmidt argues, Alexander Bickel and Martin Luther 
King Jr. each embraced a definition of law that “recognize[d] processes of cultural 
change, social disorder, and political agitation as integral to the legal process” 
rather than located outside it.70 
One might argue, of course, that what each of the protagonists represented 
as the separation of law and society was in fact a separation between preferred 
conceptions of legality. Defenders of Jim Crow did not portray established social 
customs as extralegal. They took them to be the appropriate source of legal 
norms. Their folkways were their stateways. In Edwards’ terms, their point of 
reference was local law—law as (local) society—rather than national law. Racial 
liberals derived their norms from supralocal sources and turned to supralocal 
authority to realize them. In the students’ case, antilegalism bespoke antagonism 
to a particular representation of legality, namely, the institutional and professional 
realm inhabited by the NAACP, in which law was the “completion” and therefore 
the end of action. Nevertheless, their own strategy—the continuous enactment of 
“alternative social practice,” continuous engagement in “the performance of 
right”—itself created its own legality in the form of a persistent, thickly normative 
claim to justice.71 
Indisputably, in each case the protagonists’ specific conception of law—as 
force, capacity, mode of action, or claim—was profoundly important to the way 
they mobilized for or against its use. Likewise, Bickel and King conjured with law 
in a fashion that suited their strategies for its deployment. Alike in their 
understanding of law as “an unfolding social process” inseparable from the 
struggles that gave it social and political presence, both blurred the positivist 
distinction between law and society that, according to Schmidt, animated others.72 
That said, the implications of their positions were opposed. Bickel stressed the 
dialogic quality of law. The impossibility of maintaining as “law” any mode of 
legality distinct from existing customs and traditions led him to argue that “legal 
reformers, particularly the courts, [ought] to defer to social norms.”73 King, in 
 
68. Id. at 643. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 653. 
72. Id. at 658. 
73. Id. at 661. 
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contrast, focused on what was required to give basic legal principles real social 
standing. “For King, the recognition of the process of law in society was a call to 
action.”74 Unlike the students, he did not reject legal process. But his conception 
of the relation of action to law was one that, like theirs, regarded law as claim to 
justice. 
In a clever historiographical coda, Schmidt demonstrates that historical 
accounts of the civil rights movement have themselves participated in the debate 
over the relationship of law to society in a manner that echoes the arguments of 
the protagonists themselves. As a methodology for understanding the movement, 
he concludes, “challenging the conception of law as a bounded, exogenous locus 
of power and influence seems a useful starting point.” From this perspective, law 
functions constitutively within society rather than causally on society. At the same 
time, it is necessary to recognize that drawing a distinction between law and 
society was implicated in the way in which “historical actors understood their 
world and the role of law in that world”; it had a decided influence on their 
various strategies.75 Whether or not it is of analytic use, in other words, the 
distinction itself is an essential object of historical inquiry. 
To unravel law from society is to hold out the hope of escape from law, to 
resist its ubiquity, and thus to refuse the completion it brings. In Norman 
Spaulding’s essay, human awareness lies precisely in the possibility of refusal—
refusal to be bound, to be completed, to be ended or contained, whether by law, 
psychoanalysis, sociology, or history—and, in holding the moment of refusal 
indefinitely open, of engagement in the dream work (displacement, confusion, 
doubt) that seeks a distinct form of consciousness.76 One is reminded of Bertolt 
Brecht’s destitute cripple, George Fewkoombey, who dreams of a Day of 
Judgment, “the greatest arraignment of all times . . . the only really essential, 
comprehensive and just tribunal that has ever existed,” which would judge “the 
living . . . the dead . . . all who had in any way wronged the poor and defenceless” 
in proceedings that would last hundreds of years.77 To resist completion is to lay 
an eternal claim to justice.78 
Resistance to completion, however, is itself resisted. “We want self-
 
74. Id. at 662. 
75. Id. at 676. 
76. Norman W. Spaulding, The Historical Consciousness of the Resistant Subject, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 677 (2011). 
77. BERTOLT BRECHT, THREEPENNY NOVEL 384–85 (Desmond I. Vesey trans., 1958); see 
also Christopher Tomlins, The Threepenny Constitution (and the Question of Justice), 58 ALA. L. REV. 979, 
1001–03 (2007). 
78. See 2 WALTER BENJAMIN, Karl Kraus (Fragment), in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1927–1934, at 
194 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., Rodney Livingstone et al. trans., 1999); 2 WALTER BENJAMIN, 
Karl Kraus (Dedicated to Gustav Glück), in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1927–1934, supra, at 433, 443–44, 447–
48, 456–57; Tomlins, supra note 23, at 205–06. 
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mastery.”79 The desire for completion is understandable: an uncontained 
awareness is as ontologically terrifying as the finality of death. And so we end our 
resistance through forms of avoidance, notably forgetting.80 We displace, trim, 
contain—or we are contained. We complete our resistance, or have it completed 
on our behalf by structures of law, politics, and history that fashion the subject as 
compliant—a consenting legal subject possessed of a settled knowledge. Even 
theories of politics and law that begin from the position of the resistant subject 
almost always transcend resistance by turning it into something else, whether 
fulfillment (resistance as liberation) or futility (resistance as oppression). 
“Revolution and resistance are reduced to exceptional events—aberrations verging 
on the ahistorical and nearly always charged with the terror of anarchy.”81 
Constitutions replace revolutions, citizens replace resistant subjects, the rule of law 
creates boundaries to replace boundlessness. Fewkoombey awakens from his 
dream of justice to find that he is himself the condemned.82 
It seems that society has the last word by hanging Fewkoombey. Yet Brecht 
tells us that, in his waking moment, he “has understood how ancient is the crime 
to which he and his kind fall victim.”83 The question that remains, in other words, 
is what knowledge one possesses at the moment of awakening, what memory the 
resistant subject brings to bear on the materiality that presents itself when she 
wakes up. 
History can answer that question, Spaulding suggests, by avoiding 
completion, taking memory seriously. But history, particularly legal history, more 
often inspects its protagonists’ recollections through the telescope of law than 
through their own psychic instruments. For history needs an identifiable legal 
subject, as Hayden White has it, that can “serve as the agent, agency, and subject 
of historical narrative,” a narrative overwhelmingly of identities understood as 
jurally constituted.84 History as activity, in short, presupposes law and thus 
sustains it. To resist the presupposition, Spaulding turns to Foucauldian 
“counterhistory” and its idea of revolution “revealing origins marked by conflict 
running time out of mind.”85 This turn supports a profound critique of American 
legal history, whose attachment to the rule of law either reduces resistance to 
lawlessness or completes it in narratives of legal reform—the always-desired 
achievement of lawfulness—and represents resistance either as heroic or as tragic. 
 
79. Spaulding, supra note 76, at 681. 
80. See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the 
Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003); see also Tomlins, supra note 24, at 32–35. 
81. Spaulding, supra note 76, at 682. 
82. Tomlins, supra note 77, passim; BRECHT, supra note 77, at 396. 
83. 3 WALTER BENJAMIN, Brecht’s Threepenny Novel, in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1935–1938, 
supra note 78, at 6. 
84. Spaulding, supra note 76, at 685; HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: 
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 13, 12–14 (1987). 
85. Spaulding, supra note 76, at 691. 
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“In neither case, it must be said, is the centered legal subject placed in doubt. We 
are, in short, repeatedly tempted by our attachment to law to forget that resistance 
is not something to be overcome, but rather the point of entry for modern 
history.”86 
IV. LEGAL HISTORY WITH/OUT LAW? 
Of Counterhistory, Resistant Subjects, Representation, and the Spectacular 
If we are to avoid dissolving history into law, we must attempt to write legal 
history without assuming law, or at the very least imagine how to write of its 
beginning and end. But is this not to dissolve law into “nothing but history” and 
hence just another form of completion? Unless one is to hold history up as the 
one permissible universal solvent that completes everything, therefore, one must 
know how to write of history’s beginning and end, too. This is, of course, to push 
modern history away from its humanist origins, and its antifoundationalist present, 
toward metaphysics.87 But here is no problem. Resistance in Spaulding’s sense is, 
precisely, the refusal of completion, the act of holding fissures open rather than 
closing them. Such resistance properly belongs to the domain of metaphysics. 
After all, the counterhistory that Spaulding invokes, of which Foucault speaks—
the counterhistory to that which “pacifies society, justifies power, and founds the 
order . . . that constitutes the social body”—shows “that laws deceive, that kings 
wear masks, that power creates illusions, and that historians tell lies.”88 This 
counterhistory, the only resource of the subject resisting her completion, necessarily 
dwells in the realm of the metaphysical. For it relies on outwitting the trick, on 
revealing the secret, on deciphering sealed truths, on detaching humans from their 
given historic-juridical consciousness.89 It is a form of history that can only be 
dreamed of before it can ever be known. 
If it is necessarily metaphysical, how do we portray “counterhistory”—
particularly in the realm of legal history, whose texts are so imbued by the 
grounded orderliness of law, its linear instrumentalism, its functionality, its hunger 
for power? How do we determine whether its adversarial institutions might indeed 
act as “structures of resistance,” as Spaulding says, given that it is so easy to “fail 
to recognize” resistance at work?90 The answer that Barbara Welke offers is to 
turn to a new optic: from lines of text to lines of sight. 
Welke’s “Owning Hazard” is a terrifyingly graphic illustration of law and 
 
86. Id. at 691. 
87. See 4 WALTER BENJAMIN, On the Concept of History, in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1938–1940, 
supra note 78, at 389. 
88. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE 
FRANCE, 1975–1976, at 72, 73 (David Macey trans., 2003). 
89. Id. at 72. 
90. Spaulding, supra note 76, at 691. 
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history hard at work together on resistant subjects, the burned bodies of 
children.91 It is a literal representation of the will of law to complete what cannot 
be completed—injury compensated, legislation passed, consumers disciplined, 
“safety purchased through loss”92—and of history to be the story of completion, 
the narration of a puzzle solved, of “closure” negotiated (trans-acted), of the 
ownership of death and suffering passed on from victim to agent. Although 
completion is what we most desire from our inspection of the body in its agony 
and death, Welke enjoins us to resist it. The promise of completion is proven a lie, 
over and over again, by the burned body’s incessant reiteration. Loss never 
purchases safety. The hazard must be owned, and ownership never ceases. The 
requirement is repeated again and again.93 Welke gives us the counterhistory to 
completion not by discovering an alternate possibility, an untaken path, in the 
materials she presents—counterhistory is not pluralistic counternarrative—but by 
an act of exposure that dismantles the process of production of history from texts. 
Her exposure tears gaping holes in narrative’s effortless assemblage of the mise-en-
scène, through which an audience can clamber to finger the burnt cloth, hear the 
screaming child, peer at the dictated memoranda of account, and judge for itself. 
“Owning Hazard” is at once profoundly Rankean—what really happened, again 
and again and again—and profoundly anti-Rankean, “tak[ing] apart evidence that 
in the scholarly endeavor becomes reduced to a seamless narrative, to restore to 
the reader/viewer a role in the interpretive process.”94 But in order to be this kind 
of history, “Owning Hazard” is first theater, epic theater, which is to say “the 
representation of conditions.”95 In the simple act of putting on a show, “Owning 
Hazard” creates a dialectical image of law as a “condition[ ] of life”96 that is at 
once searingly real and endlessly open for inspection. 
If Barbara Welke shows us modern law as dialectical image, theater, 
spectacle, Peter Goodrich offers us a deep analysis of the potency of that 
representation.97 His point of departure is the studied absence of attention given 
to the legal spectacle heretofore. “The law depends upon, is supported by, exists 
through an array of background techniques, apparatuses of appearance, a 
theatrical machinery of solemnization and approbation that is largely pre-
conscious . . . [T]hey are the apparatuses that make the law appear but, for it to be 
law, the machinery of theatre of its manifestation has to be seen through, which is 
 
91. Barbara Young Welke, Owning Hazard: A Tragedy, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 693 (2011). 
92. Id. at 761. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 695. On Leopold von Ranke and on “Rankean” history, see NOVICK, supra note 21, 
at 27–28, 29–31. 
95. Walter Benjamin, What Is Epic Theater, in ILLUMINATIONS: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS 
147, 150 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968). 
96. Id. 
97. Goodrich, supra note 52. 
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to say overlooked, penetrated, passed unwittingly by.”98 Thus the history of the 
legal spectacle remains unwritten, “the juristic use of images and performances” 
ignored.99 
The question, patently, is why? Why has the history of the legal spectacle 
remained so determinedly unwritten? Goodrich offers three reasons. First, law 
denigrates sight. Its practitioners are not trained to see, but rather to inscribe and 
file, to look downward at “their warrants and proofs, pleadings, tables and rolls.”100 
But why does law denigrate sight? Because, second reason, its need to dissimulate 
is greater than its need for spectacle. “Images give law its power and glory, its aura 
and effect. Images, however, reference what cannot be heard or seen directly and it is precisely 
this vanishing quality to legal images that gives them their effect, their quality as 
phantasms, apparitions, manifestations of power.”101 Again, why? What do those 
images reference that is so disturbing, that requires them to vanish at the moment 
of their apprehension? The answer is theology: the spectacle of the law is the 
spectacle of the divine. “[T]he symbols and synecdoches that made up the 
spectacle, the ritual performances and plastic presences of legality had been 
inherited from another jurisdiction and a longer established tradition.”102 Legal 
texts must be shorn of that spectacle because “it would be most dangerous to 
address in law what precedes and instantiates legality.”103 Hence “the apparatus of 
appearance and machinery of visibility, was precisely to be precluded from 
view.”104 
The third and most profound reason lies in a further dissimulation; or, at 
least, a displacement. Law, Goodrich tells us, is sovereign and transcendent. It 
belongs, although silently, to theology, existing in hierocratic opposition to 
oeconomy, to the executive and the administrative, the realm of mere government. 
It is this double form that modern law inherits from theology in the 
distinction between legislative power and executive action, substance and 
relation, norm and decision. Sovereign power rules as a transcendent 
form, as a universal expression and carrier of the image of the absolute, 
but it is the executive and the administration that govern, that execute the 
details and determine right and wrong in action.105 
In this system, 
[g]overnance is what happens. Rule is what appears to happen. The 
image, which shuttles between the two, is a legal devise that hides the 
absence of law in the oeconomic order, in an administrative realm where it 
 
98. Id. at 811. 
99. Id. at 774. 
100. Id. at 783. 
101. Id. at 790 (emphasis added). 
102. Id. at 792. 
103. Id.  
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 794. 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
1058 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
is not sovereign dictate but pragmatism, the quotidian of institutions that 
continues in its everyday order, its networks and decisions.106 
In the upshot, the spectacle, and its “affective effect . . . is preserved in silence.”107 
Goodrich’s unwritten history evokes a more general dialectic, one that recalls 
structural functionalist anthropology—which has paid purposeful attention to the 
theatricality of law.108 Since any social universe is predicated on a metaphysic of 
order, quotidian enactments of legality are as much about constituting and re-
presenting that order as they are about managing its breach; this is society 
worshiping its normative self, reproducing its transcendence as a living 
abstraction. But also, and here is the dialectic, law is a metapragmatic means, a 
cosmic tautology, by which the obligatory is rendered desirable, the desirable 
obligatory. For structural functionalist anthropologists, these were universal truths. 
Goodrich’s conjuncture of legality and sacral imagery, by contrast, inhabits both 
the historical and the suprahistorical. It is embedded in the empirical murk of time 
and place, but also appears as a general theory of legal spectacle. As such, it raises 
the question not of unwritten history, but of how we should write history with 
attention to theory. 
Take, for example, Goodrich’s claim (aphoristically restated) “no law without 
hierarchy, no hierarchy without law.”109 Empirically, one may counter with 
examples drawn from acephalous African societies, peoples like the Nuer of the 
Sudan. Speaking of their law, Edward Evans-Pritchard once said that, sensu stricto, 
they have none, only to go on to write about it in exquisite detail,110 as did Howell 
in his Manual of Nuer Law.111 At the other end of the spectrum, the modern 
Western end, what of the operations of international law and arbitration?112 Again 
in a suprahistorical vein, Goodrich argues in his commentary on McPherson113 that 
law everywhere requires publicity and theatricality. Here, too, it is not difficult to 
think of exceptions. Since the 1970s, writes Hussein Agrama of the patently 
Euromodernist legal regime of Egypt, personal status courts have heard cases in 
 
106. Id. at 808. 
107. Id. at 793. 
108. The anthropological literature on the theatricality of law is too extensive to annotate 
here, but for one celebrated example, see MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE 
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (2nd ed. 1967). 
109. Goodrich, supra note 52, at 793–95. 
110. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer of the Southern Sudan, in AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
293 (M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard eds., 1940). 
111. PAUL PHILIP HOWELL, A MANUAL OF NUER LAW, BEING AN ACCOUNT OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW, ITS EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COURTS ESTABLISHED BY THE 
SUDAN GOVERNMENT (1954). 
112. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
(1996). 
113. McPherson v. McPherson, [1936] A.C. 177 (Can.). 
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private,114 just the sort of thing that brought the wrath of the Privy Council down 
upon Justice Tweedie. 
But more importantly, there is a translucent trace to be found in Goodrich’s 
account of McPherson, a clue that helps explain when it is that the law has to be 
public, when it tends to be saturated in spectacle, and when it can take itself 
behind closed doors. In making his argument for the necessity of image-redolent 
spectacle, Goodrich points out that, while Tweedie was excoriated for taking the 
legal process out of the public eye, his judicial decision nonetheless stood. On one 
hand, the sanctity of the “sovereign” law that rules was firmly asserted in the 
criticism of the process; on the other, the enactment of the decree nisi—an act of 
“administration that govern[s]”—was upheld.115 One might ask, why is that judicial 
decision deemed merely “administrative” and not also an exercise of sovereign 
law? Or in other words, how do we know when the law rules rather than governs, 
when, in its iterative practice, it is theology and when oeconomy? 
If the answer is “when it is spectacle”—which is implied in the assertion that 
where there is no spectacle there is no law—we are faced with a tautology. The 
tautology disappears, however, and the glimmer of explanation appears, if we 
think about the problem by recourse to Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence. 
Recall Benjamin’s observation of the Great Criminal. He draws our ambivalent 
admiration, and is of enormous concern to authority, not because he breaks 
sundry laws but because he violates the law, thereby undermining the very 
foundations of order and sovereign governance.116 Extend a step further and the 
general point becomes clear: When the law asserts its sovereignty—or when it is 
called into question—it appears to do so by means of spectacle, of sacral images, 
of Ritualization, upper case. When law, indefinite and ordinary, works its means 
and ends, it does so by way of humdrum administrative techniques, of everyday 
ritualization, lower case.117 
The latter is no less law than is the law. It is just law in another register. It is 
in this workaday register, to close Goodrich’s circle, where the immanent 
theology, the spectral images, and the latent dramaturgy of things legal make 
themselves invisible, only to re-present themselves, to force themselves into the 
light of day, when the law makes itself manifest, when it declares its sovereignty. 
This may also account for the adiaphorism of the legal academy of which 
Goodrich speaks in explaining why legal spectacle has not been much studied. 
Could it be that—whether or not the academy is afflicted by pragmatism—its 
predominant object of study and its everyday concerns are not the law, at least as 
Benjamin might have distinguished it, but law, the quotidian realms of legality in 
 
114. Hussein Ali Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious 
State?, 52 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 495, 512–14 (2010). 
115. Goodrich, supra note 52, at 794. 
116. BENJAMIN, supra note 28, at 241. 
117. See Lavi, supra note 11, at 830–32 (discussing the anthropology of ritual). 
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which spectacle, imagery, dramaturgy lie quietly at rest, lurking latently beyond the 
scholarly gaze? After all, to the degree that legalities diffuse themselves into the 
culture of the ordinary, of the everyday, of the pragmatic business of being-and-
doing, the sacral, spectacular moments of (the) law constitute a very small 
proportion of its life. 
V. LAW, DIS/ENCHANTMENT, CULTURE 
Of Secularization, Ritual, and Estrangement 
In part, Shai Lavi’s essay118 might be read as a counter to Goodrich’s 
determined unveiling of the spectrality of law, his attempt to enchant our history 
by drawing attention to “the shades of a sacred past or of a transcendent future 
that lurk beneath” its rational-secularized surfaces.119 Indeed, Lavi’s essay is 
something of an antidote to the turn of legal history toward the metaphysical 
suggested by “law as . . .” that Lavi identifies as of a piece with a wider reaction in 
legal and sociolegal scholarship to the work of disenchantment undertaken in the 
tradition of Max Weber by empiricism, historicism, and positivism.120 Not that 
Lavi is a skeptic. His own historical research simply cautions him against treating 
enchantment and disenchantment as opposed inclinations with polar theoretical 
implications. For him, they proceed hand in hand. 
How so? First, argues Lavi, the Weberian theory of secularization itself 
created the chimera of an enchanted religious past from which modernity is seen, 
retrospectively, to have departed; even more, modernity constituted itself as the 
epitome of the secular rationality that experienced faith as enchantment—and 
then projected its own experience of that faith onto the past. Far from being linear 
and sequential phenomena, then, enchantment and disenchantment were 
constructed simultaneously. Second, modernity invented an anthropology of ritual 
as a means of understanding behavior it now deemed irrational. That 
anthropology invested religious practice—which carried no connotation other 
than careful, repetitive adherence to rules of conduct, “the apt performance of 
what is prescribed”121—with intense symbolic meaning and sacral significance. 
Just as rationalization responds to the modern conceit that nothing is without 
reason, Lavi observes, “ritualization stems from the equally modern notion that 
nothing is without meaning.”122 
 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 814. 
120. See Blank, supra note 12; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal 
Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2004). 
121. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 62 (1993), quoted in Lavi, supra note 11, at 825. 
122. Lavi, supra note 11, at 825. 
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Applying these theoretical perspectives to the history of Jewish religious law 
in Germany, Lavi finds that, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
as the formerly autonomous Jewish community was brought under the 
supervision of the increasingly secular German state, its religious law was 
subjected to harsh criticism as “uncivilized and unbecoming of a modern age of 
reason, progress and rationality.”123 Coterminously with a discourse of 
disenchantment that condemned it as superstition, however, Jewish religious law 
was represented by both its critics and its adherents as enchanted. Familiar 
practices, the meaning of which lay on their surface in the very act of their 
reiteration, underwent a process of estrangement, of “ritualization.” Jewish 
tradition became “a riddle, the symbolic and hidden significance of which has to 
be deciphered . . . supernatural, exotic.”124 
Lavi draws a moral here for “law as . . . .” If “law as . . .” is a reaction to 
twentieth-century legal realism and sociolegal positivism—a reaction that 
emphasizes the imaginative, the symbolic, the metaphysical—is not its attempt to 
reenchant itself enabled by that prior moment of disenchantment? For his own 
part, Lavi suggests, first, that we pause to consider the affinities between 
disenchantment and enchantment, specifically “the logic of their 
codependence”;125 and second, that we consider anew the dialectic of religion and 
secularization, not, like Goodrich, to discover the metaphysical embedded in the 
rational, but to explore the extent to which meaning lies in the minutiae of 
practice itself, in habit and repetition. 
The manner in which Lavi runs together enchantment, ritualization, and 
symbolization, and introduces into the mix the role in modernity of anthropology, 
challenges us to think further about the relationships among them. Although 
anthropology, he says, “is known for making cultures and customs that are distant 
and foreign more comprehensible”—that is, for disenchanting them—it also 
“strives to make that which is, in fact, becoming ever more familiar, into 
something strange, alien and enchanted.”126 Many would argue, of course, that 
ostensibly familiar things are in fact “strange, alien and enchanted,” that it does not 
require anthropology to make the point. Still, Lavi’s larger observation holds. 
Indeed, it holds for humanists and social scientists across the breadth of the 
academy: critical estrangement is precisely what we do. Bertolt Brecht called it 
Verfremdung (defamiliarization), the effort to create in a public a capacity for critical 
insight by distancing it from the otherwise self-evident ordinariness of what it was 
seeing.127 For an example we need look no further than Welke’s “Owning 
Hazard,” which defamiliarizes consumption, dramatically, by refracting it through 
 
123. Id. at 823. 
124. Id. at 825. 
125. Id. at 842. 
126. Id. at 832. 
127. See, e.g., MEG MUMFORD, BERTOLT BRECHT 60 (2009). 
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injury, agony, and death.128 
If estrangement is the epistemic touchstone of what we do, let us apply it to 
our theory-work; specifically, let us defamiliarize ritualization and symbolization—
which, self-evidently, seem to be associated with enchantment. Well, are they? 
Almost ninety years ago, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, in a classical piece of 
anthropological writing, answered affirmatively, arguing that ritualization enchants, 
that it infuses mystery into the ordinary, that it symbolizes in a manner that 
demands decoding.129 But a later generation of anthropology—embodied, 
genealogically, in the work of Evans-Pritchard, Mary Douglas, and Edmund 
Leach—took to treating ritual and symbolism as largely technical, repetitive 
behavior. Evans-Pritchard showed that African oracles, which appear to non-
Africans as the most mysterious of ritual manipulations, are regarded by both 
adepts and supplicants as largely pragmatic, forensic procedures;130 in a similar 
vein, Leach saw ritual as the communicative aspect of all behavior, repudiating 
altogether the dichotomy between the numinous and the profane.131 
There is, in short, a large difference between Ritual, upper case, and 
ritualization, lower case.132 In many cultural contexts, ritualization is less about 
enchantment than about habitual ways of doing things. Similarly, a symbol may be 
a puzzle to be decoded, but that does not make it a mystery, nor in itself 
enchanted, any more than a cipher is a thing of the Gods. It is only a mystery if it 
resists decoding and demands an interpretation whose referents can never be 
finally determined. All behavior is symbolic but only some of it is enchanted. 
The lack of any necessary relationship between ritualization or symbolization 
and enchantment does not invalidate Lavi’s argument; after all, he is careful to 
treat enchantment and disenchantment as co-present, not opposed to each other. 
Still, it would be helpful to know more about the substance of ritualization here, 
about its communicative content for those involved, about the numinous 
dimensions of the symbolic in Jewish law as it came under the secularizing impact 
of the German state, if only to determine the extent to which this historical 
account of “the relationship between science, realism, and disenchantment on the 
one hand, and metaphor, imagination, and enchantment, on the other” does 
 
128. See Welke, supra note 91. 
129. ALFRED R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, THE ANDAMAN ISLANDERS: A STUDY IN SOCIAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY (1922); see also ALFRED R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN 
PRIMITIVE SOCIETY (1952). 
130. E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE 
(1937). 
131. E.R. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA: A STUDY OF KACHIN 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE (The Athlone Press 1970) (1954); see also MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND 
DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPT OF POLLUTION AND TABOO (Routledge Classics 2002) (1966). 
132. See Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Introduction to MODERNITY AND ITS 
MALCONTENTS: RITUAL AND POWER IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA, at xi (Jean Comaroff & John L. 
Comaroff eds., 1993). 
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indeed take us beyond the opposition between “law and” and “law as . . . .”133 For 
just as there exists no necessary relationship between ritualization and 
symbolization on the one hand and enchantment on the other, so the 
enchantment of the law is not necessarily distinguishable from, or opposed to, its 
technical dimension or its rationalization. 
Which should come as no surprise. For, to be sure, modernity sui generis has 
sacralized the technical. A succession of its millennial faiths—Communism, 
Fascism, Free Market Capitalism—have all preached the power of techne to 
construct a better world for all. Perhaps the most potent expressions of this faith 
are evident in the fetishization of the law, of its instrumental capacity, as a 
systematic repertoire of rational practices, to yield an ordered, equitable, just 
society. What could be more enchanted than to believe that law has a life of its 
own: that it has the wherewithal to shape the very forces and relations that actually 
shape it, to create the world in its own image, to determine, for both good and ill, 
things that happen in that world, to make things appear commensurable, to yield 
rational solutions to irrational problems. These are all entirely magical ideas. 
Collectively, they indicate that it is in the very hyperrationality of the law that its 
fetishization, its ultimate enchantment, lies. 
All of this suggests that Lavi’s moral for “law as . . .” may not after all be 
fatal to its purpose. For if “law as . . .” has emerged in reaction to law’s 
disenchanters, it is a reaction that recognizes their disenchantment as itself a 
means to enchant, a means heavily favored by the present but with a long history 
of its own, a means that “law as . . .” resists. Lavi has underscored the affinities of 
disenchantment and enchantment. But what he describes as a codependence is 
more appropriately conceived of as a dialectic, a dialectic that leads us not simply 
to the metaphysical embedded in the rational, but also to the rationality of 
modernist metaphysics. 
For some, the received—that is, the Weberian, predialectical—opposition 
between disenchantment and enchantment maps seamlessly onto a presumptive 
opposition between law and culture. Assaf Likhovski reminds us that this cannot 
be left unproblematized.134 How, Likhovski asks, are we to theorize the 
relationship between law and culture? Is it causal? Does one construct the other? 
Or reflect it? Are they mutually independent? How does resort to the so-called 
“cultural defense” in liberal legal systems inflect and illuminate that relationship? 
To answer these questions, Likhovski deploys two instances from the legal 
history of taxation. The first deals with the transplantation of income tax from 
Britain to British Mandatory Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s; given that tax law is 
often considered “technical” and hence easily transferable, Likhovski observes, it 
 
133. Lavi, supra note 11, at 814. 
134. Assaf Likhovski, Chasing Ghosts: On Writing Cultural Histories of Tax Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 843 (2011). 
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follows that its export to Palestine should tell us something about the extent of its 
cultural specificity. The second concerns income tax in Britain itself in the two 
decades after its introduction there (1799–1816); specifically, it addresses the 
cultural connotations of taxation for developing notions of privacy. To these cases 
Likhovski annexes a third, much shorter discussion of a 2004 Israeli Supreme 
Court case, Israel Religious Action Center v. Ministry of Finance, which involved the 
kabbalist miracle-worker Elazar Abu-Hatsera and his failure to pay taxes on 
money allegedly “given [to him] out of spiritual and religious belief” by followers 
whom he had blessed.135 “Here was my dybbuk”—a wandering spirit possessing a 
living body—writes Likhovski, delightfully. “How should we view Abu-Hatsera’s 
cultural defense argument, and more generally, what exactly is the relationship of 
tax law and culture?”136 His essay canvasses multiple options. Does law determine 
culture? Does culture determine law? Does either determine the other? 
If we accept the terms that Likhovski has chosen for the analysis of his cases, 
it is hard to disagree with his conclusion that causality is complex, even 
indeterminate. But the cases are so dissimilar, and involve such different species of 
encounters between law and culture, that it is difficult to draw any definite 
conclusion from them—least of all in respect of in/determinacy. The first, the 
case of Abu-Hatsera, is about the tolerance of difference on the part of a legal 
regime, and even more, about the challenge posed to liberalism by claims to the 
sovereignty of religion. The second, the imposition of income tax on Mandatory 
Palestine, arose out of, and devolved upon, the cultural politics of empire. And the 
third, the case of British taxation and privacy, concerned the dialectics of culture 
and the law within the confines of a shared social universe. Only the last is material 
to the problem of determination. The Abu-Hatsera decision turned on whether to 
grant an exception to religious difference within the hegemony of national law; the 
Palestine example on whether to treat the “natives” as like enough, or too little 
like, ordinary Britons to be taxed. In neither instance was a change in culture 
wrought by the law, or a change in law wrought by culture. In each, the law dealt 
with matters cultural either by accepting them as a legitimate exception or by 
refusing to recognize them entirely.137 
 
135. Id. at 846. 
136. Id. 
137. It is worth briefly elaborating these distinctions. In 1983, Benedict Anderson depicted 
the modernist polity as an imagined community founded on horizontal fraternity and cultural 
homogeneity. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983). Almost from that moment, if not before, nation-
states, particularly in Europe, have been engaged in a headlong rush toward ever greater 
heterogeneity. One upshot is that identity politics are almost everywhere on the rise. Concomitantly, 
legal claims made on the basis of difference—in short, “cultural defenses”—are more and more 
common. In Africa, for example, they have become epidemic, to the extent that, in South Africa, for 
one, an entire jurisprudence is emerging around them. But the point is that the law into which they 
play is not that of the cultural context whence they come, but that of the culture from which they 
demand exception. So, for instance, when Jews in Manchester, England, or Zulus in South Africa 
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In the British example, the causal connection between the law and culture—
Likhovski’s theoretical conundrum—is actually broached. But here we encounter 
another problem, a problem less of relevance than of definition. Likhovski defines 
culture in a very particular way: as “a set of ideas, beliefs, symbols, values, social 
norms, and practices which are often unconscious, are relatively stable and static, 
and are widely shared by most members of a given social group.”138 It is, he adds, 
distinct from politics and economics—and, by necessary extension, from law. 
Having reified culture and set it apart in this way, Likhovski then seeks to establish 
its relationship to another reified construct, this one left undefined: that is, “law.” 
It is not surprising that, thus conceptualized, Likhovski finds it difficult to 
discover any determinate connection between law and culture. For as legal 
anthropology has long taken pains to point out, law does not exist outside culture at 
all. It lives integrally within it. From where else could its own significata, its own 
“ideas, beliefs, symbols, values, social norms, and practices,”139 come if not from 
the cultural order of which it is part? Why else does it vary cross-culturally? 
Reciprocally, culture is everywhere mediated—given both manifest and material 
life—by law, however law may be endogenously conceptualized; which, in major 
part, is a cultural question to begin with. In short, the relation between law and 
culture is not one between two discrete, autonomous phenomena at all, but a 
relation of part to whole. Phenomena in part-whole relations, logically, neither 
reflect, nor construct, nor determine each other. They do all of these things some 
of the time and some of them all of the time. Rather than ask which determines, 
constructs, or reflects the other, the more pressing problem is to plumb the 
cultural processes by which is law made, reproduced, authorized, altered—and by 
what legal processes cultural worlds are produced, transformed, re-cognized. 
This, in turn, demands that we see culture not as “a set of ideas, beliefs, 
symbols, values . . . which are . . . relatively stable and static, and are widely 
shared,”140 but in dynamic, three-dimensional terms. A more contemporary 
anthropological view than Likhovski’s treats culture as a field of signifying 
practices, the ground on which human beings seek—by means at once material 
and meaningful—to construct themselves and others; signifying practices that may 
be more-or-less stable, more-or-less labile, more-or-less contested, more-or-less 
 
insist on exemption from the law of the land on the grounds of their beliefs, it is not Jewish rabbinical 
law or Zulu vernacular law on which their respective cultures are having an impact, but British and 
South African jurisprudence—and their capacity as liberal democratic legal systems to deal with 
diversity. Such struggles over the recognition of the excluded (example 1) are not the same as the 
problems that faced colonial regimes, whose functionaries had to decide on the treatment of 
indigeneity and difference under their regimes of rule (example 2). Nor are they the same as 
endogenous arguments in Britain, ideological arguments couched in British cultural terms, over 
privacy and taxation within a world defined by the presumption of sameness, likeness, unity (example 
3). 
138. Likhovski, supra note 134, at 846. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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enduring, variously empowered. At any historical moment, some are hegemonic, 
taken for granted, others are ideological, being the ideas and values of different 
fractions of the population that subscribe to them; some are conscious, others are 
unconscious; many are suspended in between, recognized but not fully 
cognized.141 Like economics and politics, law is constituted, reproduced, 
contested, and transformed within this field of meaning and practice. In it, some 
legal ideas, institutions, norms, and conventions become authoritative, hegemonic. 
Others become the object of ideological struggle. As they do, so they alter the 
cultural field—and, as the cultural field shifts its shape, so may they, but not 
necessarily or in any overdetermined historical proportions. 
Law and culture, culture and the law, in sum, are not causally connected in 
any simple way. Nor are they independent of each other. The one is the field in 
which the other becomes objectified, authorized, enacted, amended—sometimes, 
as we have seen, by ritual means—but never mechanically or autonomically so. In 
the life of normative signs and practices there are always excesses and deficits, 
supplements and decrements. Hence the ever-present possibility of the 
unexpected, and of the erosion of prevailing hegemonies, orthodoxies, and 
ideologies. 
What does all this suggest for the work of legal history? To the degree that it 
cannot but address this underdetermined, open dialectic of law in culture—not 
law and culture, note, nor even law as culture, but law in culture—the task of the 
discipline is to make visible the processes by which the means and ends of the law, 
in all their Ritual and ritualized guises, become portrayed, practiced, and 
understood as sensible; even more, to unravel the processes by which those means 
and ends become the hegemonic, axiomatic instruments by which right is 
exercised, by which property is made private, by which violence is sublimated into 
juridicide. By which, in other words, law becomes a fetish.142 
Modern secular law, born of the separation of lex naturae from lex dei, has 
always had the quality of a fetish. Thomas Aquinas anticipated the point in the 
thirteenth century by noting how the sacral (“grace”) completed, by perfecting, all 
“natural law.”143 The point is echoed in Benjamin’s critique of the mythic violence 
at law’s originary core,144 in Derrida’s analysis of the mystical foundation of its 
authority,145 and in Agamben’s attempt to find the key to power in the 
 
141. See 1 JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION: 
CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM, AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 19–32 (1991). 
142. See John L. Comaroff, Reflections on the Rise of Legal Theology: Law and Religion in the Twenty-
First Century, 53 SOC. ANALYSIS 193, 195 (2009), reprinted in CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOSITIES: 
EMERGENT SOCIALITIES AND THE POST-NATION-STATE 193 (Bruce Kapferer et al. eds., 2010). 
143. WALTER ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 272 (1975). 
144. BENJAMIN, supra note 28. 
145. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in ACTS OF RELIGION 
228 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002). 
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triangulation of sovereignty, the sacrificial, and the juridical.146 In the history of 
the present, the signs of law’s fetishization—“the form in which an idea will 
constantly confront the historical world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in the totality 
of its history”—become yet more pronounced.147 They are to be read in the tidal 
wave of national constitutions written and rewritten since 1989, with their stress 
on political, economic, social, even cultural rights; in the emergence of new, 
expansive forms of “transnational legality” and of legally-oriented NGOs;148 in the 
rapid growth of a global intellectual property regime;149 in the rampant 
judicialization of politics,150 its rendering into lawfare;151 in the rising, worldwide 
“hegemony of human rights”152 and everyday “legal consciousness;”153 and, most 
of all, in the resort to litigation to deal with an ever broader spectrum of everyday 
matters. None of these things in itself is new, patently; that, after all, is the point 
of theorizing them historically. But changes in degree, when they accumulate 
sufficiently and come together in new assemblages, may amount to changes in 
kind. Thus it is that “the law” appears in the present more and more as a fetish: as 
an abstraction made real, a highly animated abstraction to which is attributed the 
mythic, numinous capacity to configure the world in its own image. Interrogating 
how this has come to be is, ultimately, what legal history is for. 
VI. THE LAW AS FETISH, AS FRAMEWORK, AS GRACE 
Of War, Governance, and the Rule of Rules 
John Witt does precisely that in respect of the laws of war. For an answer, he 
turns to a history that begins in the first moments of European settlement on the 
 
146. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel 
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995). 
147. BENJAMIN, supra note 29, at 45–46; John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law and 
Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1, 22–35 (Jean 
Comaroff & John L. Comaroff eds., 2006). 
148. David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the Magnitude 
of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 87–106 (2000); see also DEZALAY & 
GARTH, supra note 112; Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and 
Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231 (2006). 
149. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES (1998); 
Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law 
Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 59 (1999). 
150. Cf. Martin Chanock, ‘Culture’ and Human Rights: Orientalising, Occidentalising and Authenticity, 
in BEYOND RIGHTS TALK AND CULTURE TALK: COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF 
RIGHTS AND CULTURE 15, 34 (Mahmood Mamdani ed., 2000). 
151. See John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword, 26 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 305 (2001); see also Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 147, at 26–31. 
152. Heinz Klug, Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and Globalization of Human 
Rights, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85 (2005). 
153. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW (1998). 
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North American mainland and continues through the present.154 His evidence 
offers almost a textbook case for fetishization. As warfare has become more 
destructive, laws of war have proliferated. And legal expertise—increasingly 
hyperrationalized and technicized, we might add—has become an integral part of 
military command and control, to the extent that “[l]awyers [now] sit in on 
targeting decisions.”155 War law itself is no modern novelty, of course; it has “run 
like a thread through the history of American military operations” and of the 
Republic’s social experience of armed conflict.156 Nor has its use changed much in 
tune with modern circumstance. The past reveals no prior golden age of American 
respect for the laws of war from which the present, in its confrontation with 
asymmetric conflicts, informal combatants, and terrorism, has diverged. 
Throughout its history, American engagement with these laws has been “a 
complex and sometimes ugly experience.”157 
How then to answer the question, “[w]hat is this thing, the laws of war?”158 
Witt suggests, as a general proposition, that law is a domain of conflict amongst 
competing social-cultural groups and that laws are framed in the course of that 
conflict. This, he says, is true of any legal regime. Take, as an example, the clashing 
cultural norms in the pursuit, practice, and purpose of combat that attended 
European relations with autochthonous American populations from the beginning 
of mainland settlement. From that clash emerged an intellectual framing of 
European war law that excluded “barbaric” indigenous violence from the ambit of 
what was allowable—which, in turn, reinforced settler perceptions of Indian 
warfare as savage and unruly. Witt’s account is interactive: cultural contest occurs 
in a legal field and (re)constructs that field. In this particular instance, it produced 
a mode of legal differentiation between European and Indian endogenous to the 
history of war law itself. Indeed, it became “a central feature of the laws of war, 
one that American jurists and soldiers helped to elaborate and secure.”159 
In other, similar cases, Witt considers how the role of American irregular 
combatants in nineteenth-century campaigns of expansion alters our 
understanding of the substance and significance of laws of war framed by military 
professionals; and he shows how the laws of war have been a resource in political 
struggles over the definition of state power and in the construction of the property 
regime of the Early Republic, notably in the matter of slavery. These historical 
cases, taken together, Witt argues, make it plain that war law has been created and 
recreated not in exegetic disquisitions upon formal doctrine but in circumstances 
of active social and cultural conflict. As such, war law stands not as a measure of 
 
154. John Fabian Witt, The Dismal History of the Laws of War, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV 895 (2011). 
155. Id. at 898. 
156. Id. at 899. 
157. Id. at 901. 
158. Id. at 896. 
159. Id. at 903. 
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the legality of the American way of warfare—the mistake made by each of the 
prevailing “master narratives”—but as a wide-ranging, persistent “framework for 
moral contestation . . . about ends and means” that has animated and shaped the 
ethical conceptualization of “some of the gravest moments in American 
history.”160 
Witt’s analysis of legal regimes as dynamic fields of social and cultural 
contestation avoids many of the problems that arise from reducing law and culture 
to discrete isolates, and from treating the latter as a static, ahistorical repertoire of 
shared beliefs and symbols. His thesis, that the legalities of war take shape in a 
contested field of meaning and practice—that is within culture—and in the process 
alter it, is convincing. To call law a “framework” for ethical debate, however, is 
open to question. In doing so, Witt suggests that law is more significant as a site in 
which action occurs than as a substantive species of practice on its own account. 
He also implies that, as a context, law’s framing function persists through time 
relatively unchanged, even as its discursive and pragmatic content may alter. This 
view of “the thing, the laws of war” as a persistent framework within which 
conflicts occur is consistent with Witt’s disapproval of the two received master 
narratives which, while offering competing perspectives (declension, novelty), 
nonetheless share a stress on discontinuity. “They can’t both be right,” he says.161 
Declaring them both wrong is Witt’s prelude to the production of an alternate 
narrative of continuity, of law as framework for multiplicitous (social, cultural, 
political) contests. 
There is no need to embrace the discredited master narratives—Witt 
effectively lays waste to them both—to point out that, as a matter of historical 
logic, they can both be right; that is, if one allows the possibility that the laws of 
war of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were different from those of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Whether or not they were is an 
empirical question. But, as we have already noted in respect of the metaphysics of 
dis/enchantment, there is good reason to be careful when considering the 
question of dis/continuity; all the more so if we recall our earlier point that, in so 
far as it is a hyperrationalized, technicist departure from the past, contemporary 
war law is almost a textbook instance of fetishization. The conclusion? We ought 
to be wary of presumptions of continuity, not least those that lurk in the 
conceptualization of law as an enduring framework—one that is essentially always 
the same thing in function if not form. If nothing else, they carry the risk of 
dehistoricizing history. 
 
160. Id. at 911. 
161. Id. at 898. Witt’s argumentative strategy here—discovery of two prevailing master 
narratives, distinct from each other and both wrong, and substitution of a third—is reminiscent of his 
earlier history of the origins of workmen’s compensation. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL 
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN 
LAW (2004). 
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Paul Frymer explores the legal incidents attendant upon one of the cultural 
conflicts that figure in John Witt’s essay: that between indigenous populations and 
the rapidly expanding antebellum American republic.162 The result is an extended 
commentary in the genre of American Political Development—of which Frymer 
is a leading exponent—on the assumption of the “weak state” that has long 
pervaded scholarship on the period.163 Frymer concedes that the antebellum 
United States did not look like a conventional imperium: it was not highly 
centralized or bureaucratized, nor was it possessed of extensive fiscal-military 
resources. This does not mean, however, that expansion was not a governmental 
project. The state may have lacked the conventional apparatuses of empire, but 
the instruments that it did possess were used effectively to further territorial 
growth. “These features of state power [were not] regulatory agencies and 
militaries, but rather the political and legal control exercised over land distribution 
through the creative use of property laws and the ability to move settler 
populations strategically so that the nation could both populate and defend the 
vast spaces.”164 This form of empire-building by subcontract was not uncommon 
among eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European imperialists; in fact, it was 
more the norm than the exception in colonial era expansion, in which a state of 
colonialism often preceded the colonial state.165 The deployment of private 
enterprise and forces of order to serve a public purpose underscores the 
significance of the state’s peripheries and proxies, its capillaries and 
noncommissioned collaborators in the microprocesses of colonization. “Land 
laws replace the need for bureaucracies, and settlers . . . replace the need for 
armies. Courts need not create or implement policy reform but need only to help 
perpetuate the legitimacy of specific rules.”166 Here we have the hidden 
transcripts—hidden, that is, in plain sight—of American state formation that are 
attracting increasing attention these days, creating precisely the nexus of legal and 
general historiography for which Laura Edwards calls.167 
Indeed, just as Edwards draws our attention to the “blur” of law and society 
at local levels of governance, so Frymer’s account of Native American removal 
makes plain how the same blur can be found at every level of state practice. Indian 
 
162. Paul Frymer, Building an American Empire: Territorial Expansion in the Antebellum Era, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 913 (2011). 
163. For recent description, critique, and debate of the “weak state” assumption, see William 
J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752 (2008), and AHR Exchange: 
On the “Myth” of the “Weak” American State, 115 AM. HIST. REV. 766, 766–800 (2010). See also BRIAN 
BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009). 
164. Frymer, supra note 162, at 917. 
165. John L. Comaroff, Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and Elsewhere: Fragments, 
Factions, Facts and Fictions, 4 SOC. IDENTITIES 321 (1998). 
166. Frymer, supra note 162, at 918. 
167. Edwards, supra note 37. For one recent example of the fusion of legal and general 
historiography, see BALOGH, supra note 163. 
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removal is typically seen as a national “policy” associated specifically with Andrew 
Jackson’s presidency; and it did have advocates in his administration, as well as in 
political-military circles.168 But, Frymer shows, Indian removal was as much 
process as policy, pursued incessantly and through a plurality of mechanisms 
throughout the legal system. “[L]egal mechanics disempowered indigenous 
populations on a day-to-day basis, moving slowly but surely to engulf their lands 
within the province of American authority. By the time ‘Indian Removal’ became 
the official policy of the national government, much of the work of American 
expansion had already been accomplished.”169 Nor was this species of legal 
imperialism a nineteenth-century invention. It began with European settlement.170 
American federalism merely added new layers, new subtleties, new sites to its 
workings. 
It is a commonplace of progressive theory—in legal history as in other 
realms of sociolegal studies—that law is the ultimate solution to the problems that 
it causes: that it furnishes the rights with which the oppressed may counter the 
might of their oppressors. Well, does it? And what if it does? Mariana Valverde 
addresses these questions in her essay on the epistemological significance of 
contemporary Canadian Aboriginal land claims litigation,171 which follows on 
fittingly from Frymer’s account of the legal mechanics of nineteenth-century 
indigenous dispossession in the United States. Her findings are quite remarkable. 
On one hand, in the matter of recognizing “native” title, Canadian courts have 
yielded a degree of remedial ground to Aboriginal claimants by allowing limited 
procedural and evidentiary provision for vernacular practices of claiming. On the 
other, in defining the sovereign against whom claims are made, the courts have 
embraced a “wholly magical” conception of “The Crown,” of its “inherent 
virtues,” and of their dutiful expression by the Canadian state, to stand in for, and 
thereby effectively fend off, what might otherwise be framed as indigenous 
rights.172 Instead of justice accomplished by a politics of recognition, the Crown 
produces completion, or promises it, in the form of “grace.”173 We are, it seems, 
returned once more to the metaphysics of enchantment. 
The threads of dis/enchantment interweave throughout Valverde’s essay. In 
the landmark 1997 case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of 
Canada ruled that territorial claims presented in the Aboriginal vernacular—in the 
performance of ritual narratives and songs, rather than in documentary and 
 
168. See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 342–57 (2007). 
169. Frymer, supra note 162, at 942. 
170. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC 
IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, 93–190 (2010). 
171. Mariana Valverde, “The Honour of the Crown Is at Stake”: Aboriginal Land Claims Litigation 
and the Epistemology of Sovereignty, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 955 (2011). 
172. Id. at 957. 
173. Id. 
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archival texts—should be reconciled at trial with “the ordinary rules of evidence” 
rather than dismissed as “hearsay.”174 Precisely how this was to be done was left 
unclear. Subsequent litigation has tended to affirm that, while “mythical” 
(enchanted) testimony might be granted exception, “there is a boundary that must 
not be crossed between a sensitive application and a complete abandonment of 
the rules of evidence.”175 The normative, disenchanted procedural episteme, in 
other words, must remain intact. To be accorded the necessary exception, 
furthermore, both mythical evidence and those who proffer it must meet technical 
standards of anthropological authenticity that prove their unchanged, unbroken 
cultural lineage. 
Meanwhile, in other cases, Canadian courts have found that the state has a 
“duty to consult” affected Aboriginal peoples in matters, for example, of resource 
development; it is a duty, though, that inheres in “the honour of the Crown” 
rather than in either the redress of historical injustice or “modern rights 
doctrines.”176 In these cases, the balance of enchantment and disenchantment is 
reversed. Where in native title litigation mythical evidence was to be 
accommodated, grudgingly, to otherwise unyielding technical rules of evidence, in 
“duty to consult” cases the Crown determines doctrine and its development. 
Valverde suggests that, in general, Aboriginal litigants might well find advantage in 
proceedings that invoke the “duty to consult.” But control over the terms of 
participation in all cases, whether by “changing what counts as evidence of legal 
possession” or by “peering into medieval mists” to refine the obligations of the 
Canadian state, remains securely in the grasp of the law.177 Here, Canadian courts’ 
epistemic innovation has produced grace in action, purposeful sovereignty in 
practice. Glancing backward to Peter Goodrich’s invocation of MacPherson—also a 
Canadian case—we are allowed another glimpse of legality-as-theology at the very 
moment of its enactment as effective oeconomy. Rather than provincialize itself 
by “putting in question” its own self-knowledge,178 Canadian law determinedly 
subsumes Aboriginal metaphysics within Eurocentric technical rules and 
disciplines in one line of cases, while enthusiastically asserting the transcendence 
of a Eurocentric metaphysics embodied indexically in the numinous honor of the 
Crown in the other. Canadian law, it would appear, is in full control of the logic of 
its own dis/enchantment, and hence of the definition of the legal resources that 
oppressed subjects might use in contests with sovereign authority. 
 
174. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (“Delgamuukw v. the Queen”), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 
(Can.). 
175. Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (Can.), quoted in Valverde, 
supra note 171, at 957. 
176. Valverde, supra note 171, at 966. 
177. Id. at 971. 
178. Id. at 956. 
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VII. TERMS OF ARGUMENT, REALMS OF DISCOURSE 
Of Law, Economics, Politics, and Governmentality 
How terms of argument are controlled, how a realm of discourse is defined, 
how epistemes are brought to life or banished is the topic of Roy Kreitner’s 
essay.179 Kreitner interrogates the late nineteenth-century American debate over 
money; specifically, over bimetallism. Famous for its roots in agrarian populism, 
the debate pitted deeply entrenched interests—farmer and industrialist, debtor and 
creditor, West and East—against each other. It climaxed in the 1896 presidential 
election. And then, abruptly and puzzlingly, it disappeared from American politics. 
Kreitner explains why by pointing to the “generative power” of the terms of 
dispute. He shows that the argument was won by transforming those terms, thus 
to produce a new discursive field and “a new discourse of money.”180 
Although Kreitner asks us to think of the battle over money as a 
jurisprudential contest, law is not foregrounded as an actor or an active principle 
in his analysis. Unlike Frymer and Valverde, he offers no catalog of cases or 
statutes—or of legal theorists. This suggests that, like John Witt, Kreitner sees 
legalities as a framework within which cultural contestation occurs, which is (more 
or less) where he ends up. But it is not where he begins. His account is rather of a 
realignment between politics, economics, and law as modalities of thought and 
action. It lays bare a discursive recoding of the terms of conflict that (i) removes 
distribution from the ambit of politics, (ii) naturalizes the economy as a realm of 
spontaneous, individualized action, and (iii) substitutes law as a facilitator of 
transactional exchanges for law as medium of purposive intervention. In place of a 
polity in which socioeconomic outcomes are a legitimate subject for political 
determination by “representatives in government,” in which government is “the 
human face of the state,” in which “the state instantiates popular will” through 
legislation, and in which law is “open to functional determination,” this 
realignment produces a “microeconomic figuration” that “banish[es] the collective 
and its politics from the money equation.”181 In that figuration, debate over 
monetary questions is “conducted in economics” not politics, money becomes 
“facilitative of purely private and wholly individual exchange, endlessly repeated, 
among all individuals,” and law becomes the “backdrop” to money’s mediating 
role, “the ground, the known quantity or accepted baseline for individual action     
. . . a limitation on what politics might even attempt to achieve.”182 
The battle of monetary standards coincided with the dissolution of classical 
legal thought in Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s antifoundational, antimetaphysical 
 
179. Roy Kreitner, Money in the 1890s: The Circulation of Politics, Economics and Law, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 975 (2011). 
180. Id. at 976. 
181. Id. at 1010. 
182. Id. at 1010–12. 
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acid bath, recounted so well by Kunal Parker.183 The coincidence suggests an 
alternative reading. Rather than mark a fundamental shift from politics to 
economics, the battle might be seen as a consequence of a modernist loss of faith 
in the possibility of absolute monetary value—the denaturalization of money—
turning it into the stuff of policy, of social construction, its meaning to be fought 
out across a whole gamut of institutional and discursive sites: politics, law, 
economics.184 Given, however, the long, troubled history of fiat currency in the 
United States and its predecessor colonies, it is difficult to imagine that late 
nineteenth-century Americans had any faith in absolute monetary value to lose. 
Which is why Kreitner’s emphasis on the modernist shift—toward the treatment 
of policy as a matter of technique to be governed by expertise rather than 
politics—is more compelling. It is also highly compatible with the history of 
American progressivism, as Kreitner’s description of the discourse that would 
dominate monetary policy underscores. It was founded on “an economics for 
which the technical analysis of . . . incentives would reach new heights in powerful 
modeling and elegance, creating (or at least greatly reinforcing) a mode of 
expertise with which it would be difficult to compete.”185 This, of course, is 
economics as science, and, less obviously, as completion, drowning resistant 
subjects in “abstract relations . . . a model of structural objectivity . . . the authority 
of scientific expertise.”186 All are modes of discourse that resonate with, rather 
than undermine, the “classical legal thought” that rendered law as a “natural(ized) 
baseline for the analysis of exchange.”187 
Kreitner himself sees the separation and naturalization of distinct “spheres” 
of law, economy, and politics as a powerfully Weberian denouement, which 
returns us once more to the salience of dis/enchantment in making sense of it. On 
one hand, the emergence of “scientific” disciplines, and the surrender of policy to 
their discourse of expertise, speaks to a process of disenchantment. On the other, 
to attribute to the human sciences a capacity to produce nomothetic knowledge 
about social life is to fetishize them in a manner that enchants their very hyper-
rationality. There is no better example of the double character of dis/enchantment 
in this respect than Roscoe Pound’s turn-of-the-century “Law in Books and Law 
in Action.”188 Pound posited “action” against “books” as a supremely 
disenchanting critique of legal formalism, laying the foundation for legal realism 
and sociolegal positivism. Simultaneously, however, he fetishized disciplinary 
knowledge as the enchanted alternative. Lawyers, he said, should “cease to assume 
 
183. Parker, supra at note 6. 
184. This interpretation was proposed by Morton Horwitz at the “Law As . . .” Conference in 
a commentary on Kreitner’s paper, available at http://ocw.uci.edu/courses/course_banner.aspx 
?id=113 (follow “Interpretations – Law, Policy, Economy – Commentary” hyperlink). 
185. Kreitner, supra note 179, at 1012. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 1012–13. 
188. Pound, supra note 56. 
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that jurisprudence is self-sufficient.”189 They should “make the law in action 
conform to the law in the books . . . by making the law in the books such that the 
law in action can conform to it.”190 How? By “look[ing] the facts of human 
conduct in the face,” which meant, crucially, “look[ing] to economics and 
sociology and philosophy.”191 The social world was to be apprehended by looking 
at once at human conduct and, by resort to professional discourses, past it. 
Disciplinary expertise alone had the capacity to judge what the facts of human 
conduct were—and what they signified.192 
Once it had separated them, Pound’s sociological jurisprudence sought to 
reconcile books with action, the juridical with the social, on its own, new, terms. 
Each was granted a specific reason for being: the disciplines existed to discover 
social facts—“the facts of human conduct”—by the deployment of expertise; the 
juridical existed to regulate them by resort to law, its own expertise. 
Reconciliation, however, was predicated on sustaining separation. Indeed, Pound 
dedicated his career to defending the legitimacy and inviolability of the juridical—
and its autonomy from the social.193 His innovation, in short, was to sharpen the 
lines of difference between the legal and its (economic, political, social) context by 
constituting each of them as distinct, and distinctive, realms of knowledge.194 
Modernity, of course, was to reify, deify, define, and discipline those realms 
of expertise, perhaps none so much as law and economics, which were later to be 
joined in a hyphenated conjuncture—Law-and-Economics—a conjuncture at 
once ideological and scholarly, enchanted and disenchanting. These disciplines, 
among others, became the producers, purveyors, and arbiters of universal truths, 
of the nomothetic and the naturalized, of new technologies of public life. And 
they shipped their truths and technologies to the farthest corners of the earth, 
where indigenous populations and places became laboratories in which those 
technologies might be tested, those truths further refined. 
Just such a passage takes us to Ritu Birla’s India,195 where a specifically 
English version of one universally enchanted technology of public life, the self-
regulating free market, was installed by the colonial state in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Narrating its history through the lens of postcolonial—
and particularly Foucauldian—theory, Birla considers the differences between 
“law and economy” and “law as economy” as optics on the workings there of 
governance. “Law and” economy, she argues, treats each element as a distinct 
 
189. Id. at 36. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 35–36. 
192. See Tomlins, supra note 10, at 199–202. 
193. Id. at 201. 
194. Id. at 200–01. 
195. Ritu Birla, Law as Economy: Convention, Corporation, Currency, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1015 
(2011). 
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system, each a logos, each “an arena outside the other.”196 In this iteration, “law” 
acts on “the economy” to produce effects, namely, “market relations.” Those 
effects may garner acceptance or provoke resistance but, whichever it is, the 
separation of the two “systems” is underscored. By contrast, “law as” economy 
stresses their mutual entailment, expressed in the etymological union of oikos with 
nomos, in a household order produced and reproduced by regulative convention, in 
practices of “arranging, managing and governing,” in administration.197 In this 
iteration, the interpellation of the market requires the deliberate disembedding of a 
prior economy from its vernacular context. To illuminate that process, Birla turns 
to political economy in its Foucauldian transformation—that is, 
governmentality—“as a potent modern arrangement of power directed at 
managing political subjects as bodies and populations,” at distinguishing, in 
language that recalls Peter Goodrich, “the ‘terrestrial’ self-interested economic 
subject” from “the ‘celestial’ abstraction of the citizen,” and at inscribing upon 
that subject modes of conduct productive of a specific habitus.198 For the legal 
historian the challenge is to locate what it is that grants governmentality its 
potency through interrogating law both as logos (after Goodrich) and nomos (after 
Edwards); both in its vocalizations of “sovereignty,” that is, and in its production 
of the social. “Thinking law as economy,” Birla adds, “opens a robust engagement 
of the relationship between law as nomos or convention”—which, she reminds us, 
Weber defined as conduct without coercion—and “law as logos.”199 The former, 
recalling Edwards, she describes as “the situated, located historicity of conduct 
and practice”; the latter, now recalling Goodrich and Valverde, as “sealed scripted 
judicial logic and sovereign (even divine) performative, as standardizing 
Benthamite logic and the commands [of] sovereignty.”200 
In showing how the Raj displaced a vernacular capitalism in India with 
colonial capitalism, how the latter was created and sustained by “market 
governance,” and how the market itself became “an ethico-political sovereign” 
that monopolized both the definition of “economy” and the “imagining of the 
social,”201 Birla returns us one last time to the dialectics of dis/enchantment. As 
she notes, the “disembedding” of the economy “marks the abstracting of the ‘self-
regulating market’ from the density of social meanings, a process that rendered 
‘the market’ a model for all social relations.”202 The market abstracted, naturalized, 
rendered universal is the market disenchanted. Yet, as Birla’s Foucauldian analysis 
demonstrates, the market was not stripped of all social meaning. It was simply 
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202. Id. at 1025. 
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overlayed with new significata, of which one, at least for the colonizer, was its 
putative universality, its rationality, its . . . modernity. Palimpsest economism, 
Steven Wilf might suggest.203 Put another way, “the” market was not 
disenchanted. It was enchanted in a different register. At the same time, vernacular 
capitalism, with all of its enchantments, continued to exist—as “culture,” at once 
ancient and ever present, at once provincialized, privatized, ritualized. “[T]he 
colonial legal regime codified shifting, locally situated customary conventions into 
scripted logics of religious personal laws, thus rendering formerly negotiable 
hierarchies and differences—themselves oppressive, and so not to be celebrated—
as rigid and fixed.”204 The thought resonates with others among our authors: 
Goodrich, Valverde, Edwards, and Wilf, already present, are joined by Lavi and 
Schmidt.205 
Birla’s conclusion stresses that the coercive force of innovation—the 
recoding of one economy as universal, another as “culture”—inheres in law as 
“sovereign performative” (logos).206 There are limits to its efficacy, of course: the 
“ever presence” of culture offers vernacular practice opportunities to evade the 
laws that attempt to regulate it. Custom retains a currency with which legalities 
cannot keep up.207 Reading law as economy, however, dissolves the difference 
between colonial and vernacular capitalism in at least one critical respect: “the 
practice of economy enacts law through arranging, managing and governing. As 
nomos or convention, economy marks a set of actions that speak, as distinct from 
the more familiar speech that acts, or the speech-act, the logos (the word and 
system) that marks the autonomous performatives of sovereignty, ethical or 
political.”208 The dissolution underscores the presence of coercion in the nomoi, the 
actions that speak, no less than in the speech-act, in the “debt servitude” of 
vernacular Indian capitalism, with its “uncompromising patriarchy and strict 
gender codes,” as much as in the colonial capitalism that sought to displace it.209 
We have run full circle to Laura Edwards’s “peace,” it seems: a peace “profoundly 
patriarchal” and “highly gendered,” in which subordinates are at once 
incorporated and kept in their place.210 
After all that we have been through, to end with the intrinsic, ubiquitous 
coerciveness of the law—a bite with every bark,211 whether logos or nomos,212 
 
203. See Wilf, supra note 31. 
204. Birla, supra note 195, at 1024. 
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American Jurisprudence of Custom, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 473 (2006). 
208. Birla, supra note 195, at 1035. 
209. Id. at 1024. 
210. Edwards, supra note 37, at 570. 
211. Wilf, supra note 31, at 560. 
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whether Calcutta or the Carolinas213—might seem a modest conclusion. So what 
else is new? Well, among other things, the numinous magic of concealment in all 
its myriad forms that inheres in legalities, in their arcane powers.214 It is this magic, 
as Catherine Fisk and Robert Gordon put it in their introductory essay, that 
“make[s] the state and its exercises of power . . . disappear,”215 whether by 
dissolving it into “nothing but history,”216 by naturalizing it,217 by hiding it out of 
sight,218 by dispersing it into webs of cultural complexity,219 or by disguising it as 
something else.220 It is in the very act of concealment, we would suggest, that the 
impetus and the possibility lie for law to complete itself, to extend its hegemony, 
to fulfill its self-appointed purpose, to secure its sovereignty. But its completion 
has often been resisted,221 its hegemony exposed,222 because, like all things occult, 
the magic of legalities—their dissimulation223—is imperfect, subject to failure. 
That which is concealed is always open to discovery; which, finally, is the task of 
history. In penetrating the magicality of the law—in opening up to critical view its 
gaps,224 silences,225 incapacities,226 or simply its routines227—lie opportunities to 
question its sovereignty, to break the grip of techne, to recover its poesis, to reassert 
its creative capacity to seek justice. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As each of us has had previous occasion to observe—indeed, one (Tomlins) 
in response to the other (Comaroff)—Janus, the God of Gates and of those who 
keep them, is surely these days the most popular of academic deities;228 little 
wonder, this, in an age of purposefully directionless direction. In the very first 
essay in this collection, Steven Wilf names Janus the God of Legal Historians.229 
Once more we are catching up to the curve. This time we are way behind. Maxime 
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du Camp, famed author of Paris, Its Organs, Its Functions, Its Life, anointed Janus the 
God of History more than 150 years ago. History, he explained, “is like Janus, it 
has two faces.” But, he added, “Whether it looks at the past or at the present it 
sees the same things.”230 
We take Wilf to be suggesting something not altogether dissimilar, if less of 
temporalities than of substance. Legal historians should be bifocal, but we should 
also temper our respect for the claims of difference made for themselves by the 
twin topoi of our attention, law and history. We must of necessity keep an eye on 
each, but the point of having two eyes is not to suffer double vision. It is to have 
properly focused, more acute in/sight. Each of the essays in this collection 
encourages us to gaze upon the past and present with two eyes, and to understand 
that, as our perspectival depth deepens, we will see how ineluctable differences 
and dichotomies dissolve into clarity—or, better yet, transpose themselves into 
dialectics of comprehensible proportions. The moral of the story? That our critical 
vision, in all its careful bifocality, ought to aspire to one resolved object of study, 
capaciously conceptualized. Legal history should not always be looking in two 
directions, forever glancing nervously from one to the other. 
“Law as . . .,” we reiterate, is neither a manifesto nor a prescriptive statement 
of intent. Neither does it seek to be a paradigm. Were it to pretend to any of these 
things, our best gift to the reader would be to declare it dead and done with. It is 
no more than “an eddy in the stream of becoming”231 that stands, at most, for an 
attempt to open up a perspective. It is also, as its ellipsis suggests, a perspective in 
progress, unfinished, incomplete, becoming—hopefully in both senses of the word. 
Having spoken here of the urge toward completion and all the dangers inherent in 
it, we are comfortable with the serial periods that mark an ongoing process rather 
than a full stop. We hope, nevertheless, that the essays presented here have 
demonstrated that “law as . . .” is not without its uses, its promises, its 
provocations. 
 
You have finished, statesman. 
The State is not finished. 
Allow us to change it 
To suit the conditions of life. 
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